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The fear  tha t  t h e  world may  soon deplete i t s  available resources  of 
copper,  nickel, and  o the r  minera l  commodities ar ises  f rom t ime  to  t ime .  The 
m o s t  r ecen t  wave of conce rn  appeared in the  early 1970s as a resul t  of r a t h e r  
severe minera l  shor tages  and  other  developments a t  t h a t  t ime .  Over t h e  
intervening years,  however, research conducted a t  IIASA a n d  elsewhere has  
concluded t h a t  minera l  depletion is not. a pressing global problem for a t  least  
t he  foreseeable fu tu re  - t h e  r e s t  of th is  cen tu ry  and well in to  t h e  next .  While 
t h e  depletion of high-grade mines  may  require t h e  use  of poorer-  quality a n d  
higher-cost  deposits, new technology tends  t o  offset t h e  adverse effects of 
depletion by reducing the  costs of exploration,  mining and  processing,  and  by 
increasing t h e  range of subs t i tu t e  mater ia ls .  
This research,  coupled with falling mine ra l  prices and  depressed m a r k e t  
condit ions in  recent  years ,  has  led some  t o  conclude t h a t  nonfuel  minera ls  
pose l i t t le  o r  no t h r e a t  t o  t h e  fu tu re  welfare of mankind.  Others,  however, 
a re  m o r e  c i rcumspect ,  aware t h a t  adequate  mine ra l  resources  alone a r e  no t  
enough.  Serious shor tages  c a n  still occur ,  a n d  las t  for several  years ,  if 
inves tment  in new mines  and processing facilities is insufficient, if t h e  
demand  for minera ls  surges  in response to booms in the  business cycle,  or if 
mine ra l  t r ade  is i n t e r rup ted  by embargoes,  civil disruptions,  and  o the r  politi- 
cal events .  In addition, new sources  of minera l  supplies, such  as seabed min-  
ing, a n d  t h e  instability of minera l  marke t s  caused by the  business cycle can  
seriously th rea ten  families, communi t ies ,  and  even countr ies  t h a t  depend on  
mining a n d  minera l  processing for income  and  ,employment .  I t  was concerns  
such  a s  these  t h a t  led IIASA t o  in i t ia te ,  in July 1982, a r e sea rch  effort on 
Mineral Trade and  Markets, a s  a project  of t h e  Pa t t e rns  of Economic St ruc-  
tu ra l  Change and lndustrial  Adjustment Program.  
This paper was originally prepared under  con t rac t  with t h e  United 
Nations and  was presented a t  t h e  exper t  group meet ing on the  Impact of 
Seabed Minerals on tlie World Economy, organized by t h e  I J N  Depar tment  of 
In ternat ional  Economic and  Social Affairs, Ocean Economics and  Technology 
Branch,  and  convened a t  t h e  United Nations Headquar ters  in New York on 20 
January  1983. It has  benefited from c o m m e n t s  received a t  this  meet ing,  a s  
well a s  from subsequent  reviews by Joel P .  Clark and  Vincent E.  McKelvey. 
The views expressed a r e  those  of t h e  au thor ,  and should n o t  be a t t r ibuted  t o  
lIASA, t h e  U N ,  or those individuals who kindly reviewed the  s tudy.  
John E. Tilton 
R e s e a r c h  L e a d e r  
Mineral Trade a n d  Markets projec t  

CONTENTS 
1 INTRODUCTION 
2 RECENT TRENDS 
2.1 Prices and Production Costs 
2.2 Location of Mining 
2.3 Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
3 IMPACTS OF SEABED NODULE MINING 
3.1 Prices and Production Costs 
3.2 Location of Mining 
3.3 Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
4 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
APPENDIX: SEABED NODULE MINING AND MINERAL TRADE PATTERNS 
A.l Recent Trends 
A.2 The Impact of Seabed Nodule Mining 
REFERENCES 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Research Report RR-83-33. December 1983 
THE IMPACT OF SEABED NODULE MINING: A QUALITATM3 ANALYSIS 
John E.  Tilton 
h t e r n a t i o n a l  Insti tute for Applied Sys t ems  Analysis,  Lazenburg,  Austria 
SUMMARY 
%is paper considers the fu ture  e f fec ts  of seabed m i n i n g  o n  the cobalt, 
copper, manganese ,  and nickel  indus t r i e s ,  and the imp l i ca t ions  for produc- 
ing  a n d  consuming  states.  The analysis is quali tative,  or conceptual,  in 
n a t u r e .  While n o  effort is made to actually measure  or q u a n t i f y  the i m p a c t s  
of seabed m i n i n g ,  impor tan t  variables that  one would  have to consider in 
making  s u c h  assessmen t s  are identi f ied.  
While deep-sea min ing  holds the promise of potentially l e s s  ezpensive  
sources of m inera l s ,  i t  also raises the specter of dislocation and  decline for 
land-basedproducers ,  m a n y  of w h o m  are located in the developing countr ies .  
There is widespread concern that u n l e s s  seabed min ing  is regulated ,  m o s t  of 
the benefi ts  flowing f r o m  th is  " c o m m o n  heritage of mankind"  wi l l  go to the 
developed countr ies  that have both the technology to exploit these mineru l s  
and  the capacity to consume  the ou tpu t .  
Despite the s tudy ' s  fairly narrow scope, two general conclus ions  
emerge .  First, es t imat ing the fu ture  i m p a c t s  of seabed m i n i n g  is a n  
ex t reme ly  complicated and d i p c u l t  endeavor. %ere is m u c h  disagreement  
about the relative costs of seabed and land-based production.  How scienti f ic 
breakthroughs and  other technological developments  d l  a l ter  fu ture  costs is 
s i m p l y  u n k n o w n ,  and to some ex ten t  unknowable .  M O T ~ O V ~ T ,  relative costs 
alone d l  no t  be the on ly  determinant  of the f u t u r e  level  of seabed m i n i n g .  
.%me countries m a y  support  s u c h  production to l e s sen  their  dependence o n  
fore ign producers.  Distressed land-based producers m a y  receive  assistance 
f r o m  their  o w n  governmen t s  and protection in the f o r m  of constraints  o n  
seabed production,  negotiated through in ternat ional  agreements .  Thus pro- 
duc t ion  m a y  be in f luenced as m u c h  by  political decisions a s  by- economic  
considerations.  ,%en i f  the fu ture  level of seabed m i n i n g  could be ascer- 
ta ined,  i t s  i m p a c t  would  be difficult to assess ex ante. Buch assessmen t s  
require knowledge of long- term supply  and d e m a n d  curves  that  goes beyond 
observed historical price and output  equilibria. Nor is it clear  how these 
curves  wi l l  sh i f t  over t i m e  in response to resource depletion,  technological 
progress, the in troduct ion of n e w  mater ia ls ,  changes  in minera l  policies,  and  
other factors.  
S e c o n d ,  t h e  po ten t ia l  i m p a c t s  of seabed  m i n i n g  a p p e a r  t o  v a r y  m o r e  a n d  
t o  be l e s s  b o u n d e d  t h a n  is o f t e n  p r e s u m e d .  For e z a m p l e ,  t h e  f irs t  c o m m e r -  
cial  m i n i n g  of seabed  n o d u l e s  is w i d e l y  a n t i c i p a t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  1990s a n d  
s e v e r a l  c o n s o r t i a  are  e z p e c t e d  to be in o p e r a t i o n  b y  t h e  e n d  of the  c e n t u r y .  
Ye t  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  t e c h n o l o g y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  o n  t h e  sca le  r e q u i r e d ,  h a s  n o t  y e t  
b e e n  p r o v e n .  f i r t h e r ,  it  is n o t  c l e a r  w h e t h e r  t h e  r e q u i s i t e  po l ic ies  to p r o t e c t  
i n v e s t m e n t s  a r e  in p l a c e .  These u n c e r t a i n t i e s  r a i s e  the  poss ib i l i t y  t h a t  
seabed  m i n i n g  c o u l d  s u f f e r  a  f a t e  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  of oi l  s h a l e ,  w h e r e  f o r  m a n y  
y e a r s  c o m m e r c i a l  p r o d u c t i o n  appeared  i m m i n e n t ,  b u t  t h e  goal  r e m a i n s  
e l u s i v e .  Moreover,  the  i m p a c t s  of seabed  m i n i n g  are n o t  f u l l y  apprec ia ted  a s  
is e v i d e n t  b y  t h e  a r g u m e n t  t l ~ a t  seabed  m i n i n g  could  n o t  f o r c e  e z i s t i n g  
l a n d - b a s e d  m i n e s  to c lose .  7he r a t i o n a l e  f o r  this p o s i t i o n  over looks  t h e  
po ten t ia l  i n f l u e n c e  of n e w  t e c h n o l o g y  o n  r e l a t i v e  c o s t s  of b o t h  seabed  a n d  
l a n d - b a s e d  m i n i n g  a n d  i g n o r e s  t h e  c o p r o d u c t  n a t u r e  of seabed  o p e r a t i o n s  
a n d  the  s u b s t a n t i a l  e f f e c t  of e v e n  l i m i t e d  p r o d u c t i o n  o n  t h e  cobalt  m a r k e t  
a n d p e r h a p s  t h e  m a n g a n e s e  m a r k e t .  
1 INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago seabed nodules were a scientific curiosity of little pub- 
lic interest Today, thanks to a number of technological advances, they 
represent a major potential source of cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel, 
and several consortia of private firms and public enterprises are seriously 
contemplating their commercial exploitation. 
Although actual production is still a number of years off, a lively interna- 
tional debate began to develop in the late 1960s over appropriate measures to 
ensure the timely and efficient development of seabed minerals, to minimize 
the adverse effects on land-based mineral producers, and to promote a wide 
and equitable distribution of the resulting benefits. While deep-sea mining 
offers the promise of a major, potentially less expensive, possibly more 
secure source of several minerals, i t  also raises the specter of dislocation and 
decline for some land-based producers, many of which are developing coun- 
tries. In addition, there is widespread concern that ,  unless seabed mining is 
closely regulated, most of the benefits flowing from this "common heritage of 
mankind" will go to the developed industrialized countries. They are in the 
best position to develop the necessary technology to exploit seabed minerals, 
and with their huge appetite for all raw materials have the capacity to con- 
sume the resulting output. 
This report considers the future effects of seabed mining on the cobalt, 
copper, manganese, and nickel industries, and the implicatic>ns for producing 
and consuming states. The analysis is qualitative, or conceptual, in nature. 
While no effort is made to actually measure or quantify the impacts of seabed 
mining, important variables that  one would have to consider in making such 
estimates are identified. The focus is on three concerns, each of which 
encompasses a se t  of questions about the future consequences of seabed min- 
ing. The first is the effect on future production costs. The depletion of higher 
grade, more readily accessible, and easier-to-process deposits exerts, over 
t ime, upward pressure on the  costs of producing minerals.  In the  past,  this 
upward pressure has been largely or completely offset by t h e  cost reducing 
effects of new technology (Barnett  and Morse 1963, Barnet t  1979). 'On a 
number  of occasions, technology has opened up entirely new sources of sup- 
ply, a s  t h e  successful extraction of copper from porphyry deposits and  iron 
from taconite so clearly i l lustrates.  Such developments help hold a t  bay the 
long-term t h r e a t  of resource exhaustion 
Do seabed nodules offer a similar opportunity? Can they keep the  costs 
and prices of cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel from rising over the  long 
te rm as  fast as they otherwise would? Are they potentially a lower-cost 
source of supply than present land-based deposits? These questions are  
important  for producers as well a s  consumers.  Pers is tent  price increases 
over t h e  long t e r m  force consumers to search for alternative materials,  and 
so adversely affect the  markets  of producers. 
The second effect of in teres t  concerns the  location of future  mining 
activity. Will seabed operations cause land-based production to decline? In 
particular,  will they reduce output in the  developing countries,  and thus  the  
contribution of mining to t h e  much  needed economic growth of these  states? 
How will seabed mining ultimately affect the  diversity of supply sources? Will 
i t  increase o r  decrease the  vulnerability of consuming countries to supply 
interruptions? Will producing firms, governments,  and international bodies 
find it easier or more difficult to exercise monopoly power, to form producer 
cartels,  or  other  ways to control mineral markets? 
The third concern involves the  welfare implications of seabed mining for 
consuming and  producing countries. In particular, how will t h e  benefits and 
costs be distributed? Will most  of the  benefits go to the  developed countries? 
Will land-based producing countries, particularly those t h a t  a re  developing, 
suffer severely? Will efforts to help the  land-based producers assist  the  
developed countries more than the developing countries? 
In examining these issues, one needs to define an appropriate t ime 
period and a base case tha t  shows how production costs, the  location of min- 
ing, and  the  distribution of benefits would evolve over the  period of interes t  
in the  absence of seabed mining. Since commercial production of seabed 
nodules may not  begin before the  mid-1990s, the  focus here  is on t h e  25-year 
period 1995-2020. 
Recent t rends in the  cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel markets  are  
assessed in Section 2,  together with their implications for t h e  evolution of 
these  markets  over t h e  period 1995-2020. This sets the  stage for Section 3 to  
consider conceptually t h e  consequences of seabed mining. Section 4 then 
describes the  research needed if the  anticipated consequences are  eventually 
to be measared and their impacts fully assessed. 
2 RECENT TRENDS 
This section investigates recent  t rends in the  prices and production 
costs, the  location of mining activity, and the  distribution of the  benefits 
f rom t rade  in  t h e  principal mineral commodities ,ontained in seabed 
nodules. 
2.1 Prices a n d  Production Costs 
Table 1 indicates the  average annual real prices in 1978 dollars for 
cobalt. copper, manganese, and nickel over the  25-year period 1954-79 in the  
US. Except for manganese, where all prices are  negotiated, t h e  prices shown 
a re  producer prices, as changes in these prices parallel movements in long- 
run costs more closely than prices determined on the London Metal 
Exchange, COMEX, or other  competitive markets .  
TABLE 1 Average annual real prices for cobalt, copper, manganese. and nickel in the 
US. 1954-79. 
Year 
Prices (1978 dollars) 
Cobalt 
( ~ e r  pound) 
6.62 
6.49 
6.24 
4.74 
4.60 
3.98 
3.41 
3.29 
3.23 
3.19 
3.14 
3.31 
3.27 
3.56 
3.41 
3.31 
3.66 
3.48 
3.72 
4.31 
4.53 
4.76 
5.05 
5.99 
11.53 
22.59 
Copper 
(per pound) 
Manganese 
(per long-ton unit) 
-- 
Nickel 
(per pound) 
1.64 
1.60 
1.78 
1.72 
1.70 
1.67 
1.64 
1.78 
1.70 
1.68 
1.65 
1.59 
1.68 
1.81 
1.90 
2.24 
2.13 
2.11 
2.13 
2.20 
2.28 
2.43 
2.50 
2.33 
2.08 
2.21 
p~ - 
Surces: US Bureau of Mines (1977a-d; 1980a-d). 
The most  striking surge in price reported in Table 1 occurs for cobalt in 
1978-79, and  reflects the  disruption of supplies from Zaire t h a t  occurred in 
1978 when rebels based in Angola invaded t h e  Shaba province and overran the  
country's principal mining areas.  The expansion of output  elsewhere and the  
substitution of alternatjve materials st imulated by t h e  unusually high price 
of cobalt, coupled with the resumption of supplies f rom Zaire and generally 
depressed marke t  conditions, have since caused the  real price of cobalt to  
drop sharply. Aside f rom this ra ther  dramatic perturbation, t h e  price of 
cobalt fell and then rose nlodestly over the  period examined. 
Copper prices display no pronounced trend, but  ra ther  appear to move 
up and down in response to short-term market  conditions. Manganese shows 
a secular decline in prices through the early 1970s with a partial recovery in 
recent  years.  In contrast ,  nickel has  had a modest but  fairly persistent 
increase in price 
While the  figures of Table 1 more or less reflect changes over t ime in the  
prices t h a t  consumers  have had to pay,* the  extent  to which they indicate 
t rends in the  long-run costs of marginal producers is somewhat less cer ta in .  
I t  is t r u e  t h a t  in competitive industries where no serious obstacles prevent 
Arms from entering or leaving, one would expect prices to fluctuate around 
long-run costs,  where t h e  la t ter  include a n  appropriate ra te  of re tu rn  on 
equity capital. If prices were below such  costs,  firms would leave the  industry 
and capacity would decline. If prices were above costs, investors would divert 
more of their  available funds into the  industry,  and expand capacity. Eventu- 
ally s u c h  behavior should push prices back toward costs. Herfindahl (1959) in 
his we11 known study of the  copper industry employed this rationale to justify 
the  use  of prices to es t imate  long-run trends in t h e  cost of producing copper. 
In monopolistic or oligopolistic industries,  prices may be maintained 
above production costs over the long t e r m ,  allowing firms to ea rn  excess 
profits. Still, the re  a re  reasons to believe such firms will adjust their  prices 
in response t o  changes in long-run costs.  Thus, changes in price may reflect 
shifts in costs, even though price levels may be maintained above costs. 
Despite such considerations, the  pri.ce t rends shown in Table 1 may  not 
accurately parallel long-run cost trends.  The mining and processing of 
metals are  energy and capital intensive. Consequently, the  sharp rise in the  
prices of energy, plants,  and equipment during the  1970s exerted consider- 
able upward pressure on production costs.  Str ic ter  regulations in the  
developed countries governing pollution control, along with higher interes t  
ra tes  worldwide, accentuated this pressure.  
While Table 1 shows the prices for mos t  of the  metals examined tended t o  
rise modestly during t h e  1970s, for two reasons producers have probably not 
yet been able to  pass on in the  form of higher prices t h e  full increase in 
long-run production costs. First, since t h e  worldwide boom of 1973-74, t h e  
economies of the  major industrialized countries have been relatively 
depressed, due largely to  high interes t  r a tes  and other macroeconomic poli- 
cies pursued to curb inflation and to maintain balance of payments.  Since 
metals  a r e  largely consumed in the  industrialized countries,  and  in particu- 
lar  in those economic sectors - capital equipment,  construction, transporta- 
tion, and consumer durables - whose ou tpu t  is highly sensitive to overall 
fluctuations in t h e  business cycle, t h e  demand for most  metals has suffered 
for near ly  a decade. It is difficult for producers to raise prices when markets  
*As the cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel markets in the US are closely tied to those 
abroad, US prices tend to parallel the prices elsewhere. Still, there are at times differences 
between the prices paid by consumers in the US and other countries. Moreover, the figures 
shown in Table 1 may not precisely reflect the average prices actually paid by US consumers 
for a number of reasons. For example, some cobalt, copper, and nickel is purchased from 
COMEX, from metal dealers, or other sources that do not adhere to the producer price. In ad- 
dition, even the producers themselves at times offer open or secret discounts from their quot- 
ed price. 
are depressed. 
Second, the cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel industries have all 
experienced considerable structural change over the last several decades. 
The host governments of some producing countries have acquired control 
over significant production capacity from multinational mining corporations. 
For this and other reasons, these industries have become more competitive. 
Under such conditions, prices can decline relative to long-run cost for pro- 
longed periods. 
Thus, while new technology could conceivably have offset the upward 
pressure on prodilction costs resulting from higher energy, capital, and pollu- 
tion control costs and in the  process prevented metal prices from rising 
sharply during the 1970s, a more likely explanation of the modest price 
increases is tha t  structural adjustment and market conditions have simply 
not yet permitted producers to pass on fully their increased costs to consu- 
mers. This explanation is consistent with the findings of available feasibility 
studies for major new mineral projects, which indicate tha t  considerably 
higher metal prices are needed to  make the expected returns attractive to  
investors. In copper, for example, analyses of the Cerro Colorado deposit in 
Panama and other major undeveloped porphyry bodies indicate tha t  a price of 
between $1.50 and $2.00 per pound of copper is needed to justify their 
development. If such new sources of supply will eventually have to be 
developed to satisfy future demand, as is widely assumed, this implies tha t  
the price of copper will have to rise appreciably in real terms to cover the 
upward shift in costs over the last decade. 
2.2 Location of Mining 
Mine production of cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel in the major 
producing countries and groups of countries is shown in Table 2(a)- (d) for 
the years 1950 and 1980, along with the  distribution of reserves in the lat ter  
year. These tables reveal several interesting aspects of the shifts in mining 
activity over the last three decades. 
(1) Despi-te the widespread belief tha t  the  developed industrialized coun- 
tries are  becoming increasingly dependent on the developing countries for 
essential mineral commodities, the  share of world output from the developing 
countries has not appreciably increased for most of the metals contained in 
seabed nodules. The notable exception is nickel, where the rise of Cuba, 
Indon.esia, and the Philippines as producers and the expansion of output in 
New Caledonia (a French overseas territory considered here as part of the 
developing world) have helped the developing countries capture 34% of the 
market compared with a modest 3% in 1950. While the share of the developed 
market ecoriomy countries has fallen from 77% to 44%, they still collectively 
produce more nickel than either the  developing countries or the socialist 
countries. With. cobalt and manganese, the developing countries have actu- 
ally seen their share of world output decline over the last 30 years, although 
as a group they still account for almost 75% of world cobalt production. 
(2) The developed countries have maintained and in some cases 
increased their share of world mine output of the four metals, not because 
TABLE 2(a)  Cobalt mine production and reserves by country, 1950 a n d  1980. 
Mine product ior~ 
- ---- - - - - - 
1950 1980 
- 
Thousands Thousands 
of tons, of tons, 
cobalt cobalt 
con ten t  Z content  
. - 
Reserves 
- -- 
1980 
Thousands 
of tons. 
cobalt 
Z conten tb  % 
Developing countr ies  
Morocco 
Philippines 
Zaire 
Zambia 
Others 
Developed market  
economy countr ies  
Australia 
Canada 
Finland 
Others 
Socialist countr ies  
Total 
a~roduct ion was under 0.25 tons. 
b ~ e s e r v e  figures were converted from pounds to metric tons and then rounded to the nearest 
5000 tons. 
S u t c e s :  Charles River Associates (1969, Table 2-1); US Bureau of Mines, (1980a. Table 5;  1982, 
~37). 
the  US and other major industrialized countries have expanded their domes- 
tic production, but ra ther  because Australia, Canada, and South Africa have 
become irlcreasingly important  mineral exporters. This suggests tha t  the  
developed industrialized countries are  relying more on imports for their  
mineral needs, even though their dependence on imports from developing 
countries have remained stable: or even declined. 
(3) In 1950 Zaire was t h e  principal producer of cobalt, t h e  US of copper, 
the  USSR of manganese, and Canada of nickel, b u t  since then  the marke t  
shares  of all of these dominant producers have fallen greatly. The most strik- 
ing example is the  drop in Canadlan nickel output  from 75% to  26% of the  
world total. Despite these declines, the  major producers of 30 years ago are  
still major producers today In contrast ,  even more dramatic shlfts in com- 
parative advantage are found in  the  location of mining for other  mineral  com- 
modities. For example, the major producer of bauxite in 1950, Surinam, saw 
i ts  output  over the  years surpassed first by Jamaica, and then  by Australia 
and Guinea. 
(4) Over the las t  several decades the  numbers  of important  metal pro- 
ducing countries have grown. Australia, Finland, and the Philippines have 
become significant producers of cobalt; Australia, Peru,  t h e  Philippines, 
Poland, and South Africa of copper; Australia and Gabon of manganese, and 
TABLE 2(b) Copper m i n e  p roduc t ion  a n d  r e se rves  by coun t ry ,  1950 a n d  1980. 
-- - 
Mine product ion Reserves  
. -- - - - . - - . -- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1950 
-- 
1980 
- - . - - - - -- 
1980 
Thousands  Thousands  Millions 
of t ons ,  of tons.  of tons ,  
c o p p e r  copper  copper  
c o n t e n t  % c o n t e n t  % c o n t e n t  % 
Developing c o u n t r i e s  1063 42 3464 44 279 55 
Chile 363 14 1068 14 97 19 
P e r u  30 1 365 5 32 6 
Philippines 10 - 305 4 18 4 
Zaire 176 7 460 6 30 6 
Zambia  298 12 596 7 34 7 
Other s  186 8 670 8 6aa 13 
Developed m a r k e t  
eoonorny c o u n t r i e s  1224 4 8 254 1 3 3 166 33 
Aus t.ralia 15 1 232 3 16 3 
Canada 240 9 708 9 32 6 
Sou th  Africa 34 1 212 3 5 1 
US 825 33 1168 15 90 18 
Other s  110 4 22 1 3 ~3~ 5 
Socialist  cour i t r ies  238 10 1812 23 60 12 
Poland  - 343 4 13 3 
USSR 2 18 9 1150 15 36 7 
Other s  20 1 319 4 11 2 
Total 2525 100 7817 100 505 100 
a ~ e s e r v e s  for unidentifed rlonsocialist courltries were allocated to other developing countries 
and other developed market economy countries in proportion to the  relative production of 
these two groups of countries in 1980. 
Sources: Metallgesellschaft (1958, pp13-14; 1981, pp29-30) and US Bureau of Mines (1982, 
~ 4 1 ) .  
Australia, Cuba. Indonesia, t h e  Philippines, and South Africa of nickel 
The entry  of new countries coupled with the  decline of the  major tradi- 
tional producers has reduced the  level of country concentration. This, along 
with a parallel decline in concentration a t  t h e  firm or enterprise level, has 
strengthened competition, and made it. even more difficult in the  cobalt and 
nickel industries for the  dominant producers t o  control the  market  price and 
to  ea rn  excess profits over a prolonged period of time. These trends compli- 
cate t h e  formatlon and maintenance of producer cartels,  and hence reduce 
the  likelihood of such collusive efforts among producers. They also enhance 
the  security of supply of the  major consuming countries,  for now an  interrup- 
tion in  output from any particular producing country can more easily be 
made up by other  suppliers 
While t h e  shifts described in the  location of mining over t h e  las t  30 years 
a re  of some intrinsic interes t ,  we have reviewed t h e m  here  in the  hope of 
gaining some insights into t h e  evolution of mining activity in t h e  future.  This 
TABLE 2(c) Manganese mine  production and reserves by country, 1950 and  1980. 
Mine production Reserves 
1950 1980 
- 
1980 
Thousands Thousands Millions 
of tons, of tons, of tons, 
actual  actual  actual  
weight % weight % weighta % 
Developing countr ies  2504 33 7 074 26 330 7 
Brazil 
Gabon 
India 
Others 
Developed marke t  
economy countr ies  1164 15 7656 29 2295 47 
Australia 15 - 1961 8 300 6 
South Africa 792 10 5695 2 1 1995 41 
Others 357 5 b - d - 
Socialist countr ies  3954a 52 1 1967 45 2245 46 
China a - 1588 6 45 1 
USSR 3861 51 10251 38 2175 45 
Others 93a 1 128 1 25 - 
Total 762Za 100 26697 100 4870 100 
a ~ i g u r e s  for 1950 exclude production in t he  socialist countries of Asia. 
b ~ r o d u c t i o n  shown for others under developing countries for 1980 includes minor amounts of 
roduction from other  developed countries. 
'Reserve figures were converted from shor t  to metric tons and then rounded to  t h e  nearest 
ve million tons. 
'Reserves s h o r n  for others under developing countries may include minor amounts of 
reserves located in o ther  developed countries 
Sburces: UNCTAD (1977, Table Ib); and US Bureau of Mines (1982, p95). 
raises the  question, to  what extent are past trends likely to continue? 
Although there is no way of knowing for certain the answer to  this ques- 
tion, where the  shifts in mining reported. in Tables 2(a)-(d) have occurred in 
a continuous and persistent manner over time, we have more confidence in 
projecting them into the future. For instance, the  share of world nickel pro- 
duction coming from the  developed countries fell from 77% to 62% from 1950 
to 1960, then to  52% by 1970. and finally to  44% by 1980, while the share of the  
developing countries consistently rose over this period. On the  other hand, a 
persistent long-run secular trend is less clear for copper. The developirig 
countries saw their share of this market rise modestly from 42% to 44% 
between 1950 and 1.960, then decline to 38% in 1970, before returning to 44% 
in 1980. Similarly, the  share of the manganese rnarket supplied by the  
developing countries climbed from 33% to nearly 40% during the 1950s, where 
i t  remained during the  1960s, before dropping to 26% during the 1970s. Had 
one projected in 1970 the developing countries' share of the manganese 
market in 1980 on t he  basis of past upward trends, the result  would have seri- 
ously overestimated the actual figure. 
TABLE Z(d) Nickel mine production and  reserves by country,  1950 and 1980. 
Mine production Reserves 
-- . .- .. - .- - - -  - - -  
1950 1980 1980 
.. - -- .- 
Thousands Thousands Millions 
of tons, of tons, of tons, 
nickel nickel nickel 
con ten t  % conten t  % conten t  % 
Developing countr ies  
Cuba 
Indonesia 
New Caledonia 
Philippines 
Others 
Developed marke t  
economy countr ies  
Australia 
Canada 
South Africa 
Others 
Socialist countr ies  
USSR 
Others 
Total 
Sources: Metallgesellschaft (1958, p31; 1981, p55); and U N  Department of Technical Coopera- 
tion for Ileveloprnent (1980, Table 3). 
Even where the trends have been consistent over the last  30 years, as in 
nickel, projections based on these trends implicitly assume t ha t  the impor- 
tant  determinants of comparative advantage will continue to change and 
hence shape the shifts in the location of mining activity in the future as  they 
have in the past.  This is a strong assumption tha t  few who ponder i t  seriously 
find comfortable to make. The possibility of major s t ructural  change is always 
present. During the 1970s, for example, the sharp rise in energy prices is 
known to have adversely affected the  production of nickel from later i te  ores. 
As t h e  shift in nickel production toward developing countries has widely 
involved the exploitation of laterite deposits, despite i ts  persistence over the  
last  30 years this shift may not  continue during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Industry investment plans provide a possible check on the reasonable- 
ness of projecting past t rends into the near future .  Major new mines take 
several years to  develop, and plans to invest in such projects are  typically 
announced 4-7 years before they come into operation. Information on the 
expansion of existing mines, and on the closure of operating mines, is al.so 
available. By carefully compiling such information, one can estimate mine 
capacity into the future and determine whether t h e  distribution of t ha t  capa- 
city is consistent with projections based on past trends. At best, however, 
this approach can provide a picture of the  industry five years into the future.  
Moreover, t h e  clarity of this picture is  dimmed by possible changes in 
announced plans tha t  may subsequently occur in response to  short-term 
market  fluctuations and other considerations 
Consequently, in assessing potential shifts in mining locations 10-40 
years in t he  future, one is ultimately forced to identify the  major deter- 
minants of comparative advantage in mining (where comparative advantage 
is defined broadly to include the  political and other factors affecting future 
investment and production decisions) and to assess how these determinants 
are changing over time. Over the last two centuries, international trade 
economists have developed a number of interesting theories for explaining 
shifts in comparative advantage. For resource trade, the factor endowment 
theory is usually considered the most relevant. Indeed, it seems self-evident 
tha t  Zaire is a major producer of cobalt because it is well endowed with 
cobalt, and tha t  Canada is a major producer of nickel because i t  is well 
endowed with nickel. Yet exactly how to define and measure a country's 
endowment of cobalt and nickel is not easy. In addition, i t  is well known tha t  
political instability, fear of expropriation, availability of infrastructure, and 
other considerations also influence where mining firms invest and produce 
minerals. 
Despite such caveats, recent research (Tilton 1983) on copper, nickel. 
and a few other mineral commodities suggests that  a significant, though far 
from perfect, relationship exists between the  mine output of major producing 
countries and their reserves* ten years earlier. This suggests tha t  the  
reserve data shown in Table Z(a)-(d) for 1980 can provide some insights into 
likely shifts in mining over the coming decade. 
For cobalt, these figures raise the  possibility that  the recent downward 
trend in  the  developing countries' share of world output may be reversed in 
the  future. More specifically, they suggest tha t  the relative output of Zaire 
will continue to decline, but that  this decline will be more than offset by pro- 
duction in the Philippines, Zarnbia, and other countries. In contrast,  the 
reserves found in developed countries a re  significantly less than their share 
of world production. For several reasons, however, considerable caution mus t  
be exercised in assessing the implications of the reserve data for cobalt. 
First, t he  consuming countries generally consider cobalt a critical and stra- 
tegic mineral, and twice during the 1970s supplies from Zaire were inter- 
rupted due to civil strife. As a result, the  consuming countries may prefer to  
purchase their supplies from more stable, developed countries, even though 
they may be less well endowed in terms of reserves than developing coun- 
tries. Second, outside of Zaire cobalt is widely produced as a by-product of 
nickel and copper. Measuring reserves in such situations is much more 
difficult, and the resulting estimates less reliable. 
The geographic distribution of copper reserves suggests tha t  the produc- 
tion of this commodity may shift somewhat during the  1980s toward the  
developing countries and away from the socialist countries. About one third 
of world production and reserves a re  found in the  developed market  economy 
'Reserves indicate the quantity of a mineral commodity found in known (discovered) deposits 
that are economic to exploit given existing mineral prices and production costs. They are one 
of several possible measures of mineral endowment, and tend to change over time in response 
to exploration and the discovery of new deposits, changes in mineral prices, and shifts in pro- 
duction costs. 
countries, and little change in their future market  share is expected. 
While the  developing countries mined 26% of world manganese produc- 
tion in 1980, they held only 7% of total reserves. So t he  declining market  
share of these countries over the last several decades may well continue in 
the future. According to Table 2(c), manganese reserves are highly concen- 
trated in two areas - the USSR with 45% of the world total, and South Africa 
with 41%. Since these two countries produced only 38% and 21% of world out- 
put in 1980, their share of world production could increase in the future. 
However, the major consuming countries may resist becoming overly depen- 
dent on these two countries. To the extent this is the  case, developing coun- 
tries and other producers with more modest reserves will have an opportun- 
ity to supply more of the world's output than would otherwise be the  case. 
In contrast to manganese, the reserve figures for nickel imply tha t  a n  
increasing proportion of world output will come from the  developing coun- 
tries. Possessing 63% of world reserves, they accounted for only 34% of mine 
production in 1980. The developed market economy countries and the social- 
ist countries on the other hand produced more than expected on the basis of 
their reserves. Here again, the implied shifts may be inhibited or retarded by 
other considerations. In particular, as noted above, nickel is extracted from 
two quite different types of mineral ores - sulfide deposits and laterite depo- 
sits. In general, the former are more profitable to  mine, since they have 
more valuable by-product recovery, higher recovery rates, and lower process- 
ing costs. This last advantage, which derives in large part from the fact tha t  
sulfide ores can be concentrated by mechanical means and so require less 
energy for t reatment ,  has increased in recent years with the rise in energy 
prices. As a result, the  shift of nickel production toward the developing coun- 
tries may be impeded, for these countries possess some 86% of the world's 
nickel reserves in laterite deposits, but  only 6% of those in sulfide deposits. 
2.3 Distribution of Costs and Benefits 
According t o  welfare theory, the changes caused by trade in a country's 
consumer and producer surpluses reflect the costs and benefits i t  derives 
from trade. These changes are illustrated in Figure l ( a )  for an importing 
country. The curve Dd is the country's domestic demand curve, t he  curve Sd 
is i ts domestic supply curve, and the curve S, i ts supply curve for imports. 
(If t he  country purchased only a small proportion of total world exports, and 
hence had no impact on the world price, the curve S, would be horizontal 
ra ther  than upward-sloping). 
In the absence of trade, the country would produce and consume the 
quantity Ql of the mineral commodity in question a t  a market  clearing price 
of PI.  Consumer surplus, defined as  the difference between what consumers 
are willing t o  pay and what they actually have t o  pay, is given by the area 
abP1.  Producer surplus, defined as the  difference between the  revenues 
received by producers and their costs, is given by the  area P l b d ,  assuming 
that  the  domestic supply curve Sd reflects the marginal costs of domestic 
production. 
A ( a )  Importing Country 
Price 
I I 
I I 
I I b 
a, O2 Quantity 
Price 7 ( b )  Exporting Country 
0, O2 Quantity 
FIGURE 1 Changes in consumer and producer surpluses due to trade. 
With trade, the country resorts to imports to satisfy domestic demand, 
as imports are available a t  lower prices than domestic prc~duction. Indeed, 
according t o  Figure l ( a ) ,  domestic suppliers cease production a t  the new 
equilibrium price P2,  and domestlc demand Q2 is entirely satisfied by 
imports. (This need not be the case, of course; some domestic producers 
may remain competitive even a t  the lower market clearing price tha t  occurs 
with trade, and Figure l ( a )  could easily be adjusted to  reflect such a situa- 
tion.) 
In any case, trade adversely aflec:ts domestic producers by reducing, and 
in this case eliminating, the producers' surplus earned by domestic Arms. 
Consumers, on the other hand, benefit f rom trade, as the c:onsumer surplus 
increases by the  area P l b c P 2 .  The net benefit - the difference between the 
gain in consumer surplus and the loss of producer surplus - is thus  given by 
the area dbcP2. 
Figure 1(b) shows the benefits from trade for an exporting country. The 
curve Ud is the  country's domestic demand curve, the curve Sd its domestic 
supply curve ,  and  t h e  curve D, i t s  export  denland curve .  Without t r ade ,  
domest ic  supply and demand a re  equal a t  t h e  quanti ty Q1 and t h e  m a r k e t  
clearing price P I .  Trade raises domestic supplp to  QZ a~!d pr ict: t o  Pz.  At t h e  
l a t t e r  price,  domestic demand is reduced,  and in tlie case ~ l l u s t r : ~ t e d  in Fig- 
ure  l ( b )  completely el iminated,  causing a decline in consumer  surplus .  Pro-  
duce r  su rp lus ,  however, increases  substantial ly,  and t h e  n e t  gain t o  the  coun- 
t r y  f rom t rade  i s  given by t h e  a rea  PBabc .  
The preceding suggests that ,  all one needs in order t o  appraise t h e  
benefits of t r ade  is a s e t  of supply and demand curves similar  to  those shown 
in  Figure 1 for the  significant importing and exporting countr ies .  One c a n  
t h e n  derive t h e  benefits for e a c h  country ,  and  through simple addition calcu- 
la te  t h e  to ta l  benefits f rom t rade  for all exporting countr ies ,  for all develop- 
ing countr ies ,  or  for any o the r  subse t  of countr ies .  Assessing shi f t s  i n  
benefits among countr ies  over t ime requires  only t h a t  t he  supply and  demand  
be es t imated for t h e  fu tu re  period of in t e res t .  I lnfortunately,  in pract ice  a 
n u m b e r  of difficulties, both conceptual  and empirical ,  m a k e  i t  ex t r emely  
difficult t o  assess  with m u c h  accuracy t h e  benefits of trade:  
(1) I t  is f a r  easier  t o  draw a hypothetical  s e t  of supply and  demand  
curves ,  a s  in  Figure 1 ,  t h a n  actually t o  determine these  cu rves  for specific 
countr ies .  Econometric s tudies  provide a t  bes t  a reliable p ic ture  of t h e  
n a t u r e  of these  curves a n d  t h e i r  elast ici t ies around the  r ange  of pr ices  a n d  
ou tpu t s  t h a t  have actually occurred in t h e  past .  They canno t  e s t ima te  t h e  
domest ic  supply curve for a n  importing coun t ry  t h a t  h a s  had  no domest ic  
prod-uction, or  t h e  demand curve  for a producing country  t h a t  had  no domes- 
t ic  consumpt ion.  Nor can  they provide m u c h  information abou t  t h e  na tu re  of 
t h e  demand curve  in importing countr ies  a t  prices t h a t  a r e  five o r  t e n  t i m e s  
g rea te r  t h a n  those ever realizeti. Yet such  information is essent ia l  for  
assessing t h e  consumer  surplus  of these  countr ies .  
(2) Supply curves for both importing and exporting countr ies  may  n o t  
reflect t h e  inc remen ta l  or  marginal  cos ts  of production. In par t icular ,  la rge  
producers  with marke t  power have a n  incentive t o  l imi t  t he i r  o u t p u t  so  t h a t  
price is mainta ined above the i r  marginal  cost .  As a r e su l t ,  t h e  a r e a  between 
t h e  supply curve and t h e  m a r k e t  price underes t imates  t h e  producer  su rp lus  
they enjoy. 
(3) Even where  t h e  supply curve  faithfully reflects t h e  cos ts  f i rms incur ,  
t h e s e  private cos ts  may  deviate fronl t h e  social costs borne by the  country  a s  
a whole. For ins tance ,  t h e  cos t  of labor t o  f irms in  developing coun t r i e s  
suffering f rom high unemployment  o r  underemployment  m a y  be far  above 
t h e  t r u e  social costs measured  in t e r m s  of t h e  value of t h e  products  or se r -  
vices t h a t  m u s t  be given up  because t h a t  labor is not  available for  o t h e r  pur-  
poses. Similarly, a n  overvalued cu r rency  m a y  resul t  in artificially h igh cos ts  
for tiomestic inputs .  Where sucli discrepancies exist  between social a n d  
private costs,  t h e  domestic supply curve  should be adjusted t o  reflect  t h e  
fo rmer  when appraising t h e  producer surplus  realized by t h e  coun t ry  a s  a 
whole. 
(4) The costs and benefits of trade are  assessed within a partial, ra ther  
than general, equilibrium framework. Consequently, the impact of mineral 
trade on other sectors of the economy is ignored. Canada and other produc- 
ing countries have a t  times expressed concern tha t  their mineral exports 
keep the value of their domestic currencies relatively high, and in the pro- 
cess inhibit balanced economic development by impeding the growth of their 
manufacturing and service sectors.  
(5) Trade may redistribute income and wealth within a country, accen- 
tuating or alleviating disparities. In addition, the government may, through 
taxes and other means, capture some of the surpluses tha t  accrue to produc- 
ers and consumers. Whether these funds are  spent on education, military 
hardware, economic diversification, o r  social security greatly affects the ulti- 
mate benefits derived from trade. Again, such considerations are  ignored 
when the benefits of trade are  assessed simply in t e rms  of the  impacts on 
consumer and producer surpluses. 
These problems have encouraged some researchers to fall back on 
trends in prices or producer revenues to appraise how the benefits of mineral 
trade are  shifting over time between consumers and producers. For example, 
the secular decline in real manganese prices noted earlier is often cited as  
evidence of a shift of benefits from producers to consumers.  Yet a little con- 
sideration clearly indicates that  this is not  necessarily a valid conclusion. If 
the decline in prices is the result  of a downward shift in the world demand 
curve over t ime, both the consumer and producer surpluses have declined. 
In the process, the proportion of total benefits going to  producers could have 
decreased or  increased. The declining price, however, has more likely been 
the result  of a downward shift  i n  the  world supply curve caused by major 
advances in earth-moving capabilities and other technological developments, 
together with the opening up of large, low-cost deposits over t ime.  So while 
prices have declined, so also have production costs. Whether on balance pro- 
ducers have received a larger or smaller surplus, and whether this surplus 
constitutes more or less of the  total benefits generated by trade, is not 
known. 
What is clear, however, is tha t  such changes tend to redistribute the 
available producer surplus. Traditional producers whose costs do not decline 
as  much as the price falls find their  benefits diminishing, while others  enjoy 
greater re turns  from trade. The adjustments forced on the former can be 
quite painful, particularly if these countries derive a substantial share of 
their government revenues and foreign exchange earnings from mineral 
trade. Understandably, they a re  likely t o  complain that  prices are  not 
"remunerative and just" for producers, even when the surplus realized by all 
producers has actually increased. 
Producer revenues, which can easily be derived by multiplying the aver- 
age price a country receives for a mineral product times its output  or ship- 
ments ,  are  also on occasion used as  a measure of the benefits from trade. In 
addition to t h e  ready availability of the necessary information, this procedure 
is justified on the grounds t h a t  private costs often exceed the  social costs of 
mineral production in developing countries. Furthermore, developing coun- 
tries generally a t tach great importance to t h e  acquisition of foreign 
exchange, and where output is largely or entirely exported, producer reve- 
nues approximate the  foreign exchange a country earns from its output. 
Nevertheless, producer revenues suffer from several serious defects as a 
measure of the  benefits tha t  even developing countries derive from mineral 
trade. In particular, certain inputs to mining and processing minerals, such 
as capital, technology under license, and expatriate labor, are likely to come 
from abroad and so require foreign exchange to acquire. As Mikesell (1975) 
and others have pointed out, such costs should be subtracted from producer 
revenues t o  obtain the net  foreign exchange earnings or retained value of 
mineral production. Even after making this adjustment, the remainder 
reflects the  benefits of trade to  the  host country only if all the domestic 
resources used in mining and processing have no social value in the  sense 
tha t  they could not be used elsewhere in the economy. Such an assumption 
may a t  times appear plausible for unskilled labor, but for other domestic 
inputs such as skilled labor, management, materials, and producer goods, i t  
seems most implausible. 
Unfortunately, there are no easy shortcuts or convenient rules of thumb 
for measuring the  benefits of trade. Trends in prices, producer revenues, and 
even retained value, though used on occasion for this purpose, can be 
misleading. To appraise the benefits of mineral trade, one is forced t o  assess 
consumer and producer surpluses. This, in turn,  requires information on the  
price tha t  consumers pay and that producers receive, on the production cost 
of producers, and on the prices that  consumers would be will.ing to  pay if 
necessary. 
Reliable estimates of what consumers are prepared if necessary to  pay 
are  particularly difficult to obtain. In part, this is because the number of end 
uses is quite high for most minerals, making it impractical to assess the  mar- 
ginal benefit of the  commodity to each. Moreover, since the introduction of 
seabed mining and its resulting impacts are  likely to occur gradually over a 
number of years, the information needed is not how much a particular user 
would pay over the next month or even year if necessary, but rather  how 
much he would demand a t  various prices after he had ample time to install 
the necessary equipment and to develop new technologies for substituting 
alternative materials or for conserving the material in question. In other 
words, the information needed pertains to  the shape and nature of the long- 
run rather  than short-run demand curve. Since this curve is affected by 
price-induced technological change and since the timing and impact of tech- 
nological change are  inherently difficult to  anticipate, i t  is not easy to obtain 
reliable estimates of the long-run supply curve, and hence of consumer 
surplus. While this is particularly t rue for supply curves 10 or 40 years in the 
future, i t  is also the case for curves tha t  pertain to  the  present. 
If one is primarily interested in the benefits of mineral trade for prod-uc- 
ers,  insights into the evolution of these benefits over time can be obtained 
from information on prices and production costs. Here the prospects of 
obtaining the necessary information appear somewhat more promising. On 
the  basis of grade of ore, size of deposit, and other considerations, mineral- 
producing firms, consulting organizations, and government agencies have 
estimated the production costs associated with both operating and potential 
mines.* This information can be used to  approximate a long-run marginal 
cost curve for the  industry, which if the  la t ter  is competitive corresponds t o  
t h e  long-run supply curve. 
Such a curve is illustrated in Figure 2 for copper. Production costs per 
pound a re  shown on the vertical axis and annual output a t  designated capaci- 
ties on the  horizontal axis. The lowest-cost mine (I) has average production 
costs (including a normal ra te  of profit) of OC1 and an annual output  of OQ1. 
The second lowest-cost mine (11) has average costs of OC2 and output  of Q1Q2. 
This figure shows t h e  costs and output for a number  of other  mines,  and in 
actually constructing such a figure one would want to include all existing and 
potential mines. The production cost for mines t h a t  recover by-products and 
co-products should be ne t  of t h e  credits these products produce. Where the  
product itself is a by-product, a s  is t h e  case for most  cobalt production out- 
side Zaire, only those costs should be counted t h a t  occur after separation 
from t h e  main product has taken place.** 
Output 
FIGURE 2 Average product ion costs  for exis t ing a n d  po ten t i a l  copper  mines .  
Figure 2 shows production costs rising ra ther  sharply initially and then  
leveling off a t  about $1.50 per pound of copper. On the  basis of available evi- 
dence, this is probably a reasonable assumption, since a number  of large por- 
phyry copper deposits become economical a t  about t h a t  price. This tendency 
for t h e  long-run supply curve to  become horizontal a t  larger output  levels 
may also be t r u e  for cobalt, manganese, and nickel. If so, and if demand is 
sufficient t o  require production from a t  leas t  some of the  relatively high-cost 
*In most cases, this informlation is proprietary and not readily available. However, t he  U S  
Bureau of Mines has  been accumulating such cost information for i t s  Minerals Availability Sys- 
tem, and has actually constructed cost curves for operating copper mines in the  U S  similar to 
the  curve shown in Figure 2 (Davidoff 1900). 
**For an  interesting conceptual discussion regarding the  long-run supply curve for mineral 
commodities produced a s  by-products, see Brooks (1965). 
deposits, then cost curves similar to those illustrated in Figure 2 provide 
information on both production costs a t  different mines (and hence in 
different producing countries) and the approximate long-term market clear- 
ing price. This, i t  will be recalled, is all tha t  is needed to assess producer 
surplus for individual countries or for groups of countries. 
Estimating the overall magnitude and geographical distribution of pro- 
ducer surplus in the future, even on the assumption of no seabed mining, is 
somewhat more difficult. Over time, production costs are likely to rise or fall 
with changes in technology, real labor costs, capital equipment costs, and 
other factors, although these may not create the obstacles that  one might 
first imagine. This is because producer surplus is not affected by parallel 
shifts, either upward or downward in the long-run cost curve, but only by 
changes in its internal shape. In this connection, what is particularly impor- 
tant is the size and number of mines operating with cost below the market 
price, and the extent to which their costs rise or fall over time relative to  
tha t  price. Such changes may occur for two reasons. First, the cost 
differential between marginal and intramarginal mines may widen or narrow. 
For instance, the differential may be reduced by the shutting down over time 
of a number of low-cost mines as their ore bodies are depleted. Alternatively, 
the cost advantages of low-cost mines may be enhanced by an increase in 
energy prices, as appears to be the case for sulfide deposits in the nickel 
industry. Secondly, if one or several dominant producers exercise market 
power and as a result a differential exists between the market price and the 
cost of marginal producers, any change over time in this differential will 
affect the surplus realized by producers. A shift towards a more competitive 
market structure, for example, would diminish i t .  
While i t  is not possible to anticipate such changes with great precision, a 
careful examination of trends in market  structure, prices of factor inputs, 
production technology, and other relevant factors can provide some insights 
into how producer surplus is likely to evolve, both in terms of its overall mag- 
nitude and its distribution among countries. 
3 IMPACTS OF SEABED MINING 
This section examines the possible impacts of seabed mining over the 
next 40 years. The focus again is on the production costs and prices of the 
mineral commodities contained in seabed nodules, the location of mining, 
and the  benefits from mineral production and trade. 
3.1 Prices and Production Costs 
Seabed mining is unlikely to raise the production costs or prices of 
cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel above what they otherwise would be, 
for if i t  were actually more expensive than the output from marginal land- 
based producers, there would be no economic incentive to engage in seabed 
production. Aside from this constraint,  however, the  range of possible 
impacts on costs and prices is quite wide. 
A t  one extreme, seabed mining could have little or no impact.  This 
would be t h e  case,  for example, if seabed mining proved uneconomical or for 
other reasons was not undertaken on a commercial scale. In addition, given 
the mineral composition of seabed nodules, limited commercial production is 
unlikely to have much  impact on copper production costs and prices, simply 
because the  quantities produced would constitute such a small proportion of 
total world output.  Seabed mining may also have a negligible impact on man- 
ganese costs and prices, even with substantial  commercial seabed mining, if 
the  mos t  attractive production technology excludes the recovery of man- 
ganese. 
A second possibility is tha t  real production costs and prices will rise bu t  
a t  a slower ra te  than  otherwise as a consequence of seabed mining. The 
depletion of low-cost mines over t ime forces society to  rely on poorer-quality 
deposits. This, in tu rn ,  tends to shift the  long-run supply curve for minerals 
outward. As this shift occurs, seabed mining may offer an  attractive alterna- 
tive to  t h e  development of high-cost land-based deposits, and in t h e  process 
help relieve, though not  eliminate, t h e  upward pressure on costs and prices. 
Finally, seabed mining could conceivably result  in lower real mineral 
prices. This possibility has on occasion been denied, on the  grounds t h a t  if 
seabed mining could produce mineral  commodities a t  costs below those of 
land-based producers, i t  would already be a reality (see, for example, Ontario 
1980). This static argument ,  however, fails to  take account of t h e  dynamic 
effects of technological change over t ime.  Scientific developments have 
greatly enhanced the  prospects for the  economic recovery of minerals from 
seabed nodules over the  las t  20 years, and such developments are  likely to  
continue in the  future .  Moreover, once t h e  commercial production of seabed 
nodules is actually under way, costs a re  likely to fall as experience and learn- 
ing accumulate.  Consequently, the  production costs of seabed mining may 
decline over t ime relative to both the  cur ren t  and future  costs of land-based 
operations. Such a possibility i s  illustrated in Figure 3, which shows seabed 
mining costs falling below those of marginal land-based producers over t ime, 
even though t h e  la t ter  a re  declining as a resul t  of the  cost-reducing effects of 
new technology and other factors. 
Fur thermore,  even if one excludes t h e  possibility t h a t  such dynamic 
considerations may make seabed mining more profitable and attractive rela- 
tive to  land-based production over t ime, t h e  real price of cobalt, and possibly 
manganese, could decline as a result  of seabed mining. This is because the  
cobalt and manganese contained in nodules could satisfy a significant share 
of total  world demand even a t  r a ther  modest ra tes  of seabed production. As 
the  price s ta r t s  to  drop, the  critical question would t h e n  be whether land- 
based or seabed producers would cease mining cobalt and manganese and 
thereby prevent prices dropping greatly. Although t h e  economic and techno- 
logical factors determining the  answer to this question a re  not totally clear, 
most  of the  consortia preparing to engage in seabed production are  not  plan- 
ning to produce manganese. Apparently they do not expect t h e  future  
marke t  price to  cover the  incremental costs of recovering manganese follow- 
ing t h e  separation of copper, cobalt, and nickel from the  ore. In contrast ,  
cur ren t  plans call for t h e  production of cobalt, a s  the  incremental processing 
costs are  presumed to  be below expected future  prices. So cobalt prices 
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FIGURE 3 Possible changes over time in average production costs for copper. 
could decline in real t e rms ,  even if seabed mining as a whole is economical 
only under rising real prices on average for the minerals i t  produces. 
So far the  discussion has assumed t h a t  prices follow or  parallel shifts in 
the costs of marginal producers caused by seabed mining. This is a reasonable 
assumption over the iong run for competitive industries,  such as copper and 
manganese. With nickel and cobalt, where one o r  a few producers have in t h e  
past tended t o  dominate production and s e t  a producer price, seabed mining 
by providing a new source of supply should promote more competition and 
reduce t h e  market  power of the  major traditional producers.  This, in tu rn ,  
would encourage the long-run price to  move toward, and eventually approxi- 
mate ,  the  long-run coste of marginal producers, whether they are  high-cost, 
land-based producers or seabed miners.  In this case,  real mineral prices 
could fall in response to seabed mining, even though production costs might 
be increasing. As pointed out earlier, however, the  nickel and cobalt markets  
have in recent  years experienced a considerable increase in competitive con- 
ditions, and as a consequence a significant discrepancy between long-run 
prices and marginal production costs may no longer exist. 
3.2 Location of Mining 
In examining t h e  impacts of seabed mineral production on t h e  location 
of mining, i t  is convenient to begin by assuming t h a t  t h e  cheapest deposits 
will be developed first, regardless of their  location, and then  to  relax this 
assumption. It is also useful to differentiate, as in t h e  previous isection, 
between th ree  possible situations: in the  first, seabed mining has  no impact 
on mineral prices; in the second, prices rise but less than  in the  absence of 
seabed mining; and in the  third, prices actually fall due to seabed production. 
The first situation should have little o r  no influence on the location of 
mining activity. Seabed production ei ther  does not occur,  or takes place on  
such a modest scale tha t  the  mineral marke t  of interest. is unaffected. 
With the second situation, where real prices rise but  more slowly than in 
the  absence of seabed mining, existing land-based mines continue to be 
profitable and remain in operation until their  reserves are  depleted. Their 
productive lives, however, may be shortcned, for additions to their reserves 
will occur more gradually over lime due to the  slower rise in price. In addi- 
tion, the  development of new land-based deposits will occur a t  a more modest 
pace, as t h e  decline in the  ra te  of increase in price will dampen t h e  incen- 
tives to conduct exploration and hence re tard the  discovery of new land-based 
deposits. I t  will also slow the shift of known deposits from submarginal t o  
marginal status.  As a result ,  mining will shift away from t h e  land and toward 
the  sea.  
The third  possible situation, where real prices actually fall, could force 
the  closure of operating land-based mines,  particularly nickel and cobalt 
mines,  even though they still contain substantial  quantities of minerals tha t  
would be profitable to exploit a t  previous prices. The likelihood of such clo- 
sures,  however, is reduced by the  high capital costs required to develop most 
land-based mines .  Since these costs are  sunk and cannot be recovered when 
the  mine shuts  down, the  decision to  stop production becomes economical 
only if price drops below the out-of-pocket or variable costs of production. 
Still, the  tendency toward earlier exhaustion, identified i n  the  previous situa- 
tion, is accentuated. Moreover, unless exploration uncovers new deposits 
with costs below those of the  existing marginal land-based producers, all new 
mine development will take place a t  sea .  
The impact of t h e  shift from land to sea  production t h a t  occurs under 
the  last  two situations on the output  of particular producing countries or 
groups of countries depends on their relative production costs. Countries 
with undeveloped deposits tha t  are  just marginal will suffer t h e  most,  in tha t  
the development of these deposits either will occur inore slowly or not a t  all. 
The large undeveloped porphyry copper deposits in Chile and Peru, for exam- 
ple, fall into this category. If seabed milling causes prices actually to  fall, it 
will again be the  marginal land producers t h a t  a re  most  adversely affected, 
but  in this  situation both operating as  well as potential mines could suffer. In 
nickel, for example, t h e  high-cost laterite deposits found mostly in t h e  
developing countries are  likely to  bear the  b run t  of any cur ta i lment  in land- 
based production, while output from t h e  relatively low-cost sulfide deposits 
found in Canada and other  developed couiltries would be little affected. 
If one now relaxes Lhe assumption t h a t  known dtlposits are  exploited over 
t ime in order of their relative production costs, i t  is clear t h a t  other  con- 
siderations may also affect the  future  location of mining. The governments of 
the  major industrialized countries,  for instance, may be prepared to subsi- 
dize seabed production, should i t  prove somewhat more expensive than  land- 
based mining, to  diversify their sources of supply and reduce their vulnerabil- 
ity to import interruptions.  Conversely, if seabed mining proves a serious 
th rea t  t o  land-based producers, host governments may protect and subsidize 
the  l a t t e r ,  r a ther  than  accept t h e  socjal dislocation and other costs associ- 
ated with domestic mine closure. If followed by a number  of countries,  such 
behavior could precipitate a subslantial  decline i n  mineral prices, and leave 
large segments  of the  land-based mining industry unprofitable. While the  
extent to  which political decisions a r e  likely to  override t h e  underlying 
economic determinants of mining location is difficult to  predict,  clearly such 
dec i s~ons  could have a major influence on the geographical distribution of 
mining activity in ?he future .  
3.3 Distribution of Costs a n d  B'encfits 
The global costs and benefits associaled with the  seabed mining of nickel 
are depicted conceptually in Figure 4.  Similar figures could be constructed 
for cobalt, copper, and manganese. 
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FIGURE 4 Changes in consumer and  producer benefits due to  seabed mining. 
The curve D in Figure 4 reflects the long-run world demand curve for 
nickel a t  the  t ime under consideration. The curve SL is the  long-run supply 
curve for land-baser1 producers. Assuming t h e  industry is relatively competi- 
tive, the  la t ter  is approximated by a smoothed version of a s tep cost curve 
similar to  tha t  shown in Figure 2 for copper. In the  absence of seabed mining, 
the  quantity Ql is produced and consumed a t  the  market  clearing price PI. 
Now, if seabed production is limited to a fixed quantity,  and if the  pro- 
duction costs over this permissible range are  constant  a t  CS and lower than  
those of marginal land-based producers, t h e  total supply curve for nickel 
from both land-based and seabed deposits can be drawn as ST in Figure 4. 
This curve coincides with t h e  supply curve for land-based producers a t  low 
prices, and then  shifts to t h e  right a t  a price equal to Cs by the amount  of 
allowable seabed production. A t  higher prices, t h e  total supply curve lies to  
t h e  r ight  of the  supply curve of land-based producers by an  amount  equal to  
t h e  ceiling on seabed production.* 
'Both the assumption of fixed costs over the relevant range of seabed production and the as- 
sumption of a fixed ceiling on seabed production could be relaxed. This would require a 
With the addition to  total supply from seabed mining, Figure 4 shows t h e  
equilibrium price drops to PZ.  At this lower price, world demand increases to  
QZT.  Seabed production is just sufficien~ to provide for this increase in 
demand and to  make ~ ? p  for the reduction in land-based production from Q1 
to Q z L .  
The fall in marke t  price coupled with the  decline in land-based output  
causes the producer surplus to  diminish by the  amount  represented in Figure 
4 by the area  P l a c P z .  World consumers,  on the  other  hand, enjoy an increase 
in their surplus equal to  the  area  PlabPz,  which exceeds t h e  loss of land- 
based producers by the amount  abc. In addition, a surplus equal t o  the  rec- 
tangle cbed is realized by seabed producers, so t h e  n e t  global benefit is abedc. 
Some of t h e  producer surplus earned by seabed miners  can ,  of course, be 
taxed and redistributed to other parties. 
I t  is interesting to  note t h a t  the  welfare costs of seabed mining a re  
borne by the  land-based producers, and t h a t  this loss is greates t  per  uni t  of 
output  for the  relatively low-cost producers t h a t  remain jn business after 
seabed mining is under way. The higher cost land-based producers tha t  a re  
e i ther  kept o u t  or pushed ou t  of the  industry by seabed production have 
smaller surpluses or rents ,  which they would otherwise have realized, and so 
lose less. 
The increase in consumer surplus caused by seabed mining benefits all 
consuming countries.  Since even the  land-based producing countries are  
consumers,  some of their producer loss is offset by consumer gains. Yet, as 
is well known, t h e  largest consumers are the  major industrialized countries - 
the  US, Japan, and member  s ta tes  of the  EEC and CMEA - and i t  is these  
countries t h a t  potentially have t h e  most t o  gain. However, as Figure 4 sug- 
gests,  the  amount  by which the consumer surplus increases and hence the  
benefits flowing to  t h e  industrialized countries car1 be curtailed by limiting 
the  amount  of mineral production permitted from the seabed. The smaller 
this l imit,  the  less price will decline and consumer surplus will increase.  
The second surplus produced by seabed mining goes initially to those 
firms and consortia engaged in this activity. Nthough these producers are  
likely to  come primarily from the  major industrialized countries,  a s  noted 
earlier,  much  of this surplus can be captured through royalties and other  
means,  and redistributed to  developing countries,  adversely affected land- 
based producers, or  other groups. 
This discussion of t h e  costs and benefits associated with seabed mining 
rests on certain assumptions tha t  should be noted explicitly. In particular,  
the  supply curve for land-based producers SL is presumed to  reflect the  social 
a s  well a s  private costs of production. If this is not. t h e  case,  and if one is 
interested ultimately in the  costs and  benefits of seabed mining for society in 
general,  ra ther  than private producers,  this curve should be modified to take 
account of such  discrepancies before the shifts in producer and consumer 
surpluses are measured.  In addition, and of m u c h  greater  importance, the  
analysis has  implicitly assumed t h a t  seabed mining is o r  will soon be 
modification of Figure 4, which would complicate the exposition, but not change the basic con- 
clusions regarding the distribution of the costs and benefits of seabed mining. 
competitive with land-based production. This is far from certain. If seabed 
mining does not take place within the foreseeable future,  none of the shifts in 
costs or benefits attributed to  this activity will occur. 
4 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The possible impact of seabed mining has  been examined in th ree  
specific areas - prices and production costs, location of mining activity, and 
the magnitude and geographic distribution of the  benefits from mineral pro- 
duction and trade. The analysis has been largely conceptual in nature ,  with 
little or no at tempt  actually to  quantify anticipated impacts. Despite this 
fairly narrow scope, two general conclusions emerge: 
(1) Measuring the  future impacts of seabed mining is an extremely com- 
plicated and difficult endeavor. To begin with, forecasting mineral markets 
10-  40 years into the future ,  even in the  absence of seabed mining, is 
fraught with difficulties, although of course certain trends can be discerned 
and projected. Mineral markets  in general are becoming more conlpetitive 
over t ime as the number of major producing firms and countries increase. 
Production is shifting from the developed to the developing countries for 
some seabed mineral commodities, and from the developing to  the developed 
countries for others.  Long-run secular trends in real prices can also be 
identified. They are  down for some seabed minerals, relatively constant for 
others,  and up for still others.  While some of these past trends are likely t o  
continue into the future,  others  will be reversed by higher energy prices, new 
technologies, or other developments. Forecasting which trends will continue 
and which will not is a hazardous business, where at  best only partial success 
can be expected. 
Even if such trends in  mineral markets could be reasonably predicted, 
the actual  amount  of seabed mining tha t  will take place over the next 40 
years is unknown. The relative costs of seabed and land-based production. a re  
the subject of much discussion and disagreement. How scientific break- 
throughs and other technological developments will alter future costs is sim- 
ply unkno-wn, and to sorne extent  unknowable. Moreover, relative costs will 
not be the only determinant of the future level of seabed mining. Industrial- 
ized countries may support such production to lessen their depe:ndence on 
foreign producers. Distressed land-based producers may receive assistance 
from their own governments, and protection in the form of constraints on 
seabed production negotiated through international agreements.  In the end, 
seabed production may be influenced as much by such political decisions as  
economic considerations. Anticipating the future course of the important 
political decisions is not easy. 
Finally, even if the  future level of seabed mining could be ascertained, 
its impacts would still be difficult to assess e z  ante.  Such assessments may 
require knowledge about segments of the long-run supply and demand curves 
far f r o m the  observed price and output equilibria of the past, which limits the  
use of econometric and other quantitative techniques. Nor is it clear how 
these curves will shift over the next several decades in response to  resource 
depletion, technological progress, the introduction of new materials, changes 
in  the  mineral policies (perhaps in response to the  perceived th rea t  of seabed 
production), and other factors. 
(2) The potential impacts of seabed mining appear to  vary over a wider 
range and to be less bounded than often presumed. For example, the first 
commercial mining of seabed nodules is widely anticipated to take place 
sometime during the 1990s, and several consortia are expected to  be in 
operation by the end of the century. Yet the necessary technology, particu- 
larly on t h e  scale required, has not  yet been proven. Nor is i t  completely 
clear t h a t  the requisite public policies to protect the needed private invest- 
m e n t  a re  in place. These uncertainties raise the  possibility tha t  seabed min- 
ing could suffer a fate similar to tha t  of oil shale, where for years commercial 
production has  appeared imminent and yet  this goal seems as  elusive today 
as  i t  did 20 years ago. 
On the other hand, the maximum impact  t ha t  seabed mining could have 
is a t  t imes no t  fully appreciated. This is clearly illustrated by the argument  
tha t  seabed mining could not force existing !and-based mines to close. As 
pointed ou t  earlier, the rationale for this position overlooks the  potential 
influence of new technology and learning by doing, on the relative costs of 
seabed and land-based mining. It  also ignores the coproduct nature  of seabed 
production, and the substantial effect of even limited production on the 
cobalt and perhaps manganese markets.  
In short,  the  development of new and unconventional technologies 
involves dealing with the unknown and entails g rea t  uncertainty. This is par- 
ticularly t rue  for seabed mining, as the extent  of i ts success ultimately will 
depend not only on economic and technological considerations but also on 
political developments. Since all of these factors are potentially erratic in 
their behavior and thus  difficult to predict, the  impacts of seabed mining over 
the next 40 years on the  welfare of land-based producers, consumers,  and 
other groups range over an extremely broad spectrum, from negligible to  
overwhelming. 
These general conclusions - tha t  seabed mining could conceivably have 
ra ther  dramatic impacts, but tha t  determining whether this will actually be 
the case is extremely difficult - are  not  terribly comforting for those whose 
future welfare could be substantially altered by seabed mining. This raises 
the question of how future  research on thls issue will cope with the  inherent  
complexities and narrow the range of possible outcomes, so tha t  appropriate 
policies might be undertaken to promote the beneficial effects of seabed min- 
ing while alleviating the  adverse conseqliences. In considering this question, 
two distinct lines of research, which could be carried out separately, appear 
worth pursuing. 
The first and probably most difficult would focus on the expected evolu- 
tion of mineral production from seabed nodules over the  next 40 years. At 
the earliest, when might  seabed mining begin? What are  the best point esti- 
mates  of seabed production for 1995, 2000, 2010, and 2020? Can a confidence 
interval be calculated for each of these estimates? This effort would entail a 
continuation and extension of the work by Nyhart el  al. (1970), Diederich e t  
al. (1979). and Charles River Associates (1981) on the costs of seabed mining. 
The expected impact of technological progress and learning by doing on 
future costs would have to  be assessed, and the findings compared with those 
of marginal land-based producers. The conclusions regarding the  potential 
profitability of seabed mining would then have to be adjusted for possible sub- 
sidies or constraints resulting from political decisions. 
While the probability of identifying all of the important factors tha t  will 
ultimately determine the future level of seabed mining and their future 
impact on this activity is not high, the level of seabed production will clearly 
be one of the major, if not the major determinant of the eventual impact of 
this activity on land-based producers and consumers. 
The second line of research would assess the expected impacts of seabed 
mining on the assumption tha t  production from this source grows over time 
in a given manner. In light of the inherent difficulties of actually forecasting 
seabed output, various growth patterns could be specified and their impacts 
assessed. Here too there is some literature, in large part the work of Adams,* 
upon which such an inquiry could build and extend. 
What essentially is required is a better understanding of the long-run 
demand curves for cobalt, copper, manganese, and nickel, and of the  long-run 
supply curves from land-based production for these commodities. Not only is 
a better picture needed of these curves as  they exist today, but also of how 
they are likely to evolve in the future. Econometric models and other quanti- 
tative techniques can provide some of the information needed. In particular, 
if properly specified, they can document the nature of the current  supply and 
demand functions over the range of recent  outputs and prices. Other tech- 
niques can then supplement this information to t race out other parts of the 
current  curves, and to appraise their likely shifts over time. 
In the case of cobalt, for example, more information is needed on its 
various actual and potential end uses and on its production costs. Should the  
price of cobalt approach that  of nickel, in what uses and to what extent would 
it  be substituted for nickel? How large are these potential cobalt markets 
now? How large are they likely to be in the future? How will the development 
of new composites, plastics, ceramics, and other materials, along with 
improved processing techniques enhancing the properties of steel and other 
traditional materials, affect the future demand for cobalt? To what extent 
has the recent instability in the cobalt market caused by interruptions in 
supply from Zaire encouraged research and development activity tha t  will 
ultimately reduce the long-run demand for cobalt? To what extent has this 
instability also shifted investment and in turn the future location of mining 
away from central Africa? How do production costs vary among the land- 
based producers, both for those mining cobalt as a main product and for 
those mining cobalt as a byproduct? How are these costs likely to shift over 
time? To what extent will Zaire, perhaps with the help of Zambia, possess the  
market power needed to  control the price of cobalt over the long term? 
While no amount of research can answer such questions for certain, 
either for cobalt or for the other mineral commodities found in seabed 
*In the early 1970s. Adams conducted a number of econcmetric studies on the impacts of 
seabed mining for the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 1970). For a list of 
these and other studies, see references cited in Adams (1980). 
nodules, a considerable amount  of qualitative information is available from 
metallurgists, market  analysts, mining engineers, and other specialists tha t  
can be used to piece together a picture of the long-run mineral supply and 
demand curves. The challenge lies in  identifying and collecting the pertinent 
qualitative information, integrating i t  with feasible quantitative analyses, and 
then analyzing and interpreting the results in an appropriate manner .  Here 
judgment and skill, as well as  diligence, are  essential. 
Moreover, given the qualitative components of such analysis, i t  mus t  be 
recognized tha t  no universally accepted statistical measures or rigorous 
rules exist for assessing the  reliability or accuracy of the findings. Judg- 
ments  regarding assumptions and interpretation mus t  be made, and will inev- 
itably be called into question. 
Such problems, however, bedevil all important and still unresolved 
issues. Otherwise, the research required would long since have been carried 
out. 
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APPENDM: SEABED NODULE MLNING AND MINERAL TRADE PAlTERNS 
The preceding enquiry examines recent trends and the potential effects 
of seabed mining in three areas - mineral prices and production costs, the 
location of mining, and the benefits from mineral production and trade. This 
appendix, prepared after the original study was completed, extends tha t  
analysis by examining the possible impact of seabed mining on mineral trade 
patterns. The first section considers past trends in the patterns of trade for 
cobalt, copper, manganese and nickel; and the second the possible conse- 
quences of seabed mining on the future evolution of these patterns. 
k 1 Recent Trends 
A trade pattern reflects the geographic flow of a particular commodity in 
international trade, and is defined by a matrix whose elements measure the 
amount of trade between each exporting and importing country over a given 
period of time such as a year. For example, trade matrices prepared by 
Fischman (1980) for copper in 1976 and manganese in 1975, a t  several stages 
of production, are shown in the Tables A1-A7. Similar tables, based on the 
work of Hubbard (1975), portray the trade patterns for semiprocessed nickel 
in 1970 and refined nickel in 1972. Comparable tables for cobalt are not avail- 
able, because the necessary information on international trade in this com- 
modity has not been collected and published. 
Historically, trade patterns have been largely ignored in the economic 
literature. This is in part because traditional international trade theory has 
focused primarily on comparative advantage and its underlying deter- 
minants. In the process, i t  has abstracted from transportation costs and the 
other factors affecting the choice of trading partners. There are, of course, 
exceptions. Location theory and a number of linear programming studies, for 
instance, have explicitly considered the flow of trade between particular 
countries. These efforts generally assume tha t  the desire to minimize tran- 
sportation costs dictates the pattern of trade. 
In recent years, however, a number of studies (Dorr 1975, Hubbard 1975, 
Santos 1976, Whitney 1976, Tilton 1966, Demler and Tilton 1980) have called 
into question the assumption that  transportation costs constitute the only, or 
even the most important, determinant of trade flows of copper, manganese, 
nickel, and other mineral commodities (though not cobalt, as the necessary 
trade data are not available). These studies find that :  
(1) International ownership ties, and the multinational mining corpora- 
tions responsible for these ties, greatly shape the pattern of mineral trade, 
often in directions that  are inconsistent with minimizing transportation 
costs. Their influence is particularly apparent for mineral commodities a t  
early stages of production, such as the ore and concentrate stage. This gen- 
eral conclusion is found to hold for trade in blister copper, manganese ore, 
and semiprocessed nickel, though somewhat surprisingly, not for copper ore 
and concentrate. 
(2) Political blocs, such as the British Commonwealth, the French Com- 
munity, and the commercial, cultural, and other ties they have created over 
the years among member countries, also influence the structure of mineral 
trade. In contrast to ownership ties, however, they are most important for 
trade in refined metal products, and have much less influence on trade a t  
earlier stages of production. This general conclusion holds for blister and 
refined copper as well as for refined nickel. It may be valid as well for fer- 
romanganese and refined cobalt, though existing studies have not examined 
these particular products. 
(3) The presence of a common border stimulates trade between neigh- 
boring countries, again primarily at  the refined metal stage of production, 
significantly more than can be attributed to the relatively low transportation 
costs between such countries. Apparently, neighboring countries often share 
common business customs and possess other mutual attributes that  stimu- 
late trade between them. This particular determinant of trade patterns is 
significant for both refined copper and refined nickel, the two commodities 
found in seabed nodules whose trade patterns have been analyzed a t  the 
refined metal stage of production. 
With respect to trends over time, some evidence exists to suggest that 
the influence of ownership ties has been declining. For several reasons, this 
finding is not particularly surprising. Over the last two decades, the mines 
and processing facilities of multinational mining companies in a number of 
developing countries have been nationalized, and are now operated by state- 
owned enterprises. Secondly, the nature of financing mineral veritures has 
changed over the last two decades. In the early years after World War 11, most 
new projects were developed and entirely owned by a single major multina- 
tional mining corporation. The 1960s saw a shift towards project financing, 
where several firms collaborate in developing new ventures. They share the 
equity investment, and borrow a large portion of the total development costs 
from banks and other lending organizations. Such financial arrangements 
are likely over time to reduce the importance of intra-firm shipments in 
international trade. Finally, the influence of Japan on trade patterns has 
grown as mineral imports into that country have increased with its rapid 
economic development. Traditionally, Japan has relied less on ownership ties 
and more on long-term contracts than other industrialized countries to 
ensure its import needs. 
Focusing specifically on the four principal mineral commodities con- 
tained in seabed nodules, one finds the evidence supporting a decline in the 
importance of ownership ties more tenuous. For copper, no trend is discern- 
able a t  the ore an.d concentrate stage (where, as noted earlier, ownership ties 
have not been significant) or at  the blister stage (where ownership ties have 
been and remain important). Only at  the refined metal stage has the 
influence of ownership t ies waned over t ime (Whitney 1976). In nickel, such 
ties shaped trade patterns in the  early postwar period a t  both the  semipro- 
cessed and refined metal stages of production, and they have continued to  do 
so in recen t  years (Hubbard 1975). 
One would also expect to  find the  influence of political blocs declining, 
reflecting the  dissolution over t h e  las t  30 years of the  major political 
empires.  Surprisingly, the  available studies provide little or no evidence to  
support this expectation. Apparently, the  t ies established during the colonial 
period to encourage trade among member  countries persist long after formal 
political bonds a r e  severed. Likewise, t h e  studies find li t t le change over t ime  
in t h e  importance of neighboring countries in stimulating trade. Where this 
factor was significant in the  past, i t  remains  so today. 
For many  mineral commodities, however, one important  change has  
clearly occurred: the  number of actual and potential t r ade  par tners  available 
to both importing and exporting countries has  increased. This development, 
in a number  of cases, has  reduced the  vulnerability of countries to  an  inter- 
ruption in  t rade with any particular partner.  I t  has taken place, in  part ,  
because a number  of new producers have entered mineral  production - Cuba 
in cobalt, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea in copper, Gabon in manganese, 
and  t h e  Philippines, Dominican Republic, and Botswana in nickel. In addition, 
Japan and a number  of European s ta tes  have become important  importers.  
In more recen t  years,  rapid economic growth in some of t h e  developing coun- 
tries has  made them significant importers as well. 
This review of the  available l i terature on mineral t rade pat terns  does not  
suggest a rapid decline in the  influence of international ownership ties, politi- 
cal  blocs, and neighboring country effects on mineral t r ade  patterns.  Along 
with transportation costs, these factors are  likely to  shape t h e  flow of mineral 
trade for some time into the  future.  In the  process, they will continue t o  
introduce a certain amount  of rigidity into the  s t ruc ture  of trade. On the  
other hand., if the  past is a reliable guide t o  t h e  future ,  t h e  number  of poten- 
tial trading par tners  for many mineral commodities is likely to grow as  new 
producers begin exporting and as developing consuming s ta tes  become 
important  importers.  
These expectations assume t h a t  past trends - o r  lack of t rends - rvill 
continue in to  the  future,  and tha t  no major s t ructural  change will substan- 
tially t ransform the  mineral industries. However, in the  case of cobalt, 
copper, manganese, and nickel, seabed mining raises t h e  possibility of such a 
s t ruc tura l  change, and i t  is t o  the  possible impacts on mineral  trade patterns 
of this development t h a t  we now tu rn .  
A2 The Impact of Seabed Nodule Mining 
The potential consequences of seabed nodule mining for mineral t rade 
pat terns ,  a s  was t h e  case for prices and production costs,  the  location of min- 
ing, and t h e  distribution of costs and benefits, range over a wide spectrum of 
possibilities. A t  one extreme, trade pat terns  will obviously be completely 
unaffected if no seabed mining occurs during the  period 1995-2020. A t  t h e  
other extreme,  t rade pat terns  could be radically altered. 
More specifically, seabed nodule mining, if i t  occurs,  will introduce new 
trade flows as production begins a t  new sources of supply. This should, a t  
least  initially, increase the  number  of actual and potential trading par tners  
for importing countries,  and s o  continue t h e  t rend in this direction t h a t  has  
characterized the  las t  30 years. Over the longer t e r m ,  however, seabed min- 
ing could reduce,  ra ther  than increase,  t h e  geographic diversity of sources of 
mineral supplies, if seabed mining proves less expensive than many land- 
based sources of supply. Such a development would concentrate  mineral pro- 
duction a t  sea and a t  a few high-quality land-based deposits, increasing t h e  
vulnerability of consuming countries t o  interruptions in t rade from any par- 
t icular source. 
In addition, seabed mining may weaken the influence of political blocs 
and neighboring count.ry effects on t rade pat terns  if i t  replaces land-based 
production, as clearly neither of these factors will shape t h e  flow of t rade 
from seabed sources. Political t ies,  however, could still play a n  important  
role, though in a different way, as some consuming countries may be 
prepared t o  provide protected markets  and in other ways to  subsidize seabed 
production by their own firms or  s t a te  enterprises in order t o  reduce depen- 
dence on foreign producers for needed mineral imports.  
The rigidities introduced into t rade pat terns  by international ownership 
ties could also be s t rengthened by seabed mining. This is particularly likely 
for t rade a t  early stages of production - namely, in nodules - as each consor- 
tia planning to  engage in seabed mining is expected to  have i ts  own land- 
based processing facilities to  which i t  will ship i ts nodules. 
Finally, i t  should be noted tha t  the  impact  of seabed mining on t rade 
pat terns  may vary considerably for different mineral commodit.ies. For 
example, several mining operations a t  sea could greatly reduce t h e  land- 
based production of cobalt, and in the  process diminish the  diversity of sup- 
ply for this commodity. The same level of seabed production, by contras t ,  
would have only a modest  i.mpact on copper mining from land-based deposits, 
and s o  would likely enhance, ra ther  than  reduce, the  geographic diversity of 
sources for this commodity. Given the mineral composition of nodules and  
the  relative size of the  market  for nickel, t h e  impact on land-based nickel 
production and the  consequences for i t s  diversity of supply would be greater  
than in  the  case of copper, but  less than  in the case of cobalt. For man-  
ganese, seabed production even a t  a modest level will have a substantial  
impact on  t rade pat terns  if this mineral commodity is actually recovered. 
However, as is well known, many of the  consortia contemplating t h e  mining of 
seabed nodules are not  now planning to  extract and  marke t  the manganese 
they contain.  
TABLE A1 Estimated distribution of world trade in copper ores and concentrates. 1976 (percentage of total 
trade, metal  ont tent).^ 
Importers 
Japan 
FRG 
u S 
Spain 
Sweden 
Belgium 
USSR 
Bulgaria 
Other 
Total 
Exporters 
Canada 
Phi l ip  
pines 
16.7 
0.3 
3.2 1.2 
Papua 
NG Chile Indonesia 
Aus- 
tralia Zaire Norway 
3.6 3.0 
1.9 1.7 
0.2 
South 
Mricab Other Total 
a~eported Cu content used wherever possible. For other countries Cu content was estimated from gross weights. 
b~ncluding Namibia (SW Africa). 
'~quates to total exports of 1204000 metric tons. 
Surce:  Fischman (1980, Table 3-9). 
TABLE A2 Estimated distribution of world trade in unreflned copper. 1976 (percen- 
tane of total trade).a 
Exporters 
South 
Importers Zaire Chile Africab Peru FRG Zambia Other Total 
Belgium 
FRG 
UK 
LTS 
China 
Japan 
Yugoslavia 
Spain 
Other 
Total 
a~ncludes econdary blister copper. 
b~ncludes Namibia (SW Africa). 
'~quates to total exports of 825000 metric tons. 
Sburce: Fischman (1980. Table 3-10). 
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TABLE A4 Estimated distribution of world trade in manganese ore, 1 9 7 5 ~  (percentages based on bin 
contentLb 
South Aus- Undistributed 
Importers Africa Gabon tralia Ghana Zaire Morocco Brazil Mexico India or other Total 
us 
Japan 
FRG 
France 
UK 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Belgium/ 
Luxemburg 
Sweden 
Spain 
Norway 
Canada 
Other 
Total 
Note: Detail may not add to totals. owing to rounding. 
a~epresents total imports of developed countries (87% of total world imports) 
blncludes ores with 10% or greater manganese content. 
'~quates to imports cf 4 003 000 metric tcns. 
S u r c e :  Fischman (1980. Table 3-3). 
TABLE A5 Estimated distribution of world t r a d e  i n  ferromanganese.  1 9 7 5 ~  (percentages based  on  gross/net  
quantities).b 
Exporters  
South Belgium/ 
I m ~ o r t e r s  France  Norway Africa Luxemburg FRG J a ~ a n  US S ~ a i n  India Other Total 
us 
FRG 
Italy 
Belgium/ 
Luxemburg 
France  
Netherlands 
UK 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Austria 
Canada 
Turkey 
Undetermined 
and  o t h e r  
Total 
Note: Figures may not add to totals, owing to rounding. 
a~epresen ts  total ferromanganese trade of "developed" countries. Includes developed countries' trade to and from 
';peveloping" and Eastern European countries, if applicable. 
Average manganese content varies only within narrow limits (75-78%). 
C ~ q u a t e s  to total imports of 1030 000 metric tons. 
Source: Fischman (1980. Table 3 4 ) .  
TABLE A 8  Estimated distribution of world trade in semiprocessed nickel. 1 9 7 0 ~ ' ~  
(percentage of total trade, metal content). 
Exporters 
New 
Importers Canada Indonesia Caledonia Australia OtherC Total 
UK 15.8 15.8 
Norway 1 8 . 4 ~  18.4 
Japan 3.9 45.8 49.7 
France 5.5 3.6 e 9.1 
Canada 1.7 4.7 6.4 
Other 0.6 0.6 
Total 38.1 5.5 51.7 4.7 100. of 
&Trade involving the socialist countries. including Cuba, is excluded. 
b~emiprocessed nickel, measured in terms of metal content, encompasses ore, matte, con- 
centrate, and oxide. 
C ~ r a z i l ,  Zimbabwe, South Africa, Finland, Burma, and Morocco may have exported semipro- 
cessed nickel in 1970; however, little is  known about these possible trade flows except that 
ey were very small. 
%his material was refined and then re-exported. 
e ~ a p a n  imported some nickel concentrate from Australia; the amount is unknown but 
resumed to be small. 
'Total trade equalled 230000 metric tons of contained nickel. 
Sburce: Hubbard (1975, Table 2). 
TABLE A7 Est imated  dis tr ibut ion of world t rade  in  refined nickel. 1 9 7 2 ~ ~ ~  (percentage of 
to ta l  t rade) .  
New South 
Impor te rs  Canada Norway UK France  Caledonia Australia Africa Other  Total 
US 
FRG 
Belgium/ 
Luxemburg 
Netherlands 
F r a n c e  
Italy 
UK 
Sweden 
Japan  
Other 
Total 
a ~ e f i n e d  nickel, measured in terms of metal content. includes all products, including ferroniclt:l, at 
he last stage before industrial use. 
'Trade involvinn the socialist countries is excluded. 
'~o ta l  trade equalled 272009 metric tons. 
Sburce: Hubbard (1975, Table 9). 
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